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Abstract
Developing economies worldwide have experienced rapid informal sector expansion
in response to formal sector unemployment. However, the macroeconomic effects of
formal-informal sector dualism have been widely overlooked. This paper develops a
two-sector, structuralist, macroeconomic model to analyze the impact of urban infor-
mal sector activity on export-led growth policy. The model uses stylized facts from
the Johannesburg informal sector and is applicable to countries where informal sector
production is concentrated in low-wage goods and commercial services. The paper
finds that trade-offs between capacity utilization and reduced income inequality could
be magnified when the existence of an urban informal sector is incorporated.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic implications of the informal sector merit increased attention given both the
predominance and growth of this sector in developing economies.1 Many countries that
underwent neoliberal economic reform in the eighties experienced rapid expansion of in-
formal sectors in response to contracting formal economies. Today, development programs
often include an informal sector/microenterprise support component based on the belief
that informal firms can improve economy wide employment through the labor-intenstive
nature of their production. In opposition to development policy, much of the recent the-
oretical literature finds that formal sector output is inversely related to informal sector
output. Since formal sector production is assumed to be more productive and lucrative
than informal sector production,2 this literature suggests that informal sector expansion
reduces economy-wide income. Thus, given the contrast between informal sector develop-
ment policy and the macroeconomic literature, additional research is needed to determine
the nature of formal-informal sector dualism.
Interestingly, the inverse relationship between formal and informal sector output de-
scribed in the literature is common despite the wide variety of approaches used. For
example, neoliberal studies of Braun & Loayza (1994) and Fortin, Marceau & Savard
(1997) treat the informal sector as tax evading and find that a growing informal sector
congests public services and reduces the economy-wide growth rate. Studies by Chaudhuri
(1989), Rauch (1991), Agenor & Aizenman (1994), and Ranis & Stewart (1994) employ a
labor market segmentation framework and find that formal sector contraction leads excess
labor to flood the informal sector, lowering the informal sector market clearing wage, and
allowing informal sector output to expand through a decline in factor costs. Gibson, Lustig
& Taylor (1986), Gibson & Kelley (1994), and Kelley (1994) use structuralist multi-sector
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macroeconomic models and either find that macroeconomic adjustment occurs through
employment shifts between the sectors due to a fixed labor supply (the first two studies) or
that the informal sector competes with the formal sector in product markets and hinders
demand-led growth (Kelley’s 1994 study).
Nevertheless, despite the common finding of an inverse relationship between the sectors,
the existing literature is limited in the reality and breadth of its application. For example,
the neoliberal studies model informal sector growth as a result of increased government
involvement, an approach unable to explain why informal sector activity has skyrocketed
at the same time that structural adjustment programs have required deregulation and
contraction of the public sector. Similarly, the labor market segmentation models define
the driving force for informal sector activity as a rigid real wage, an approach inappropriate
for explaining the empirical trend of an expanding informal sector occurring in conjunction
with economic restructuring that reduces labor market regulations.
The structuralist multi-sector macromodels provide a more realistic foundation for ex-
plaining informal sector expansion due to their assumption that informal sector activity
is driven by inadequate demand in the formal sector. Existing structuralist models have
thus far been focused on East Asia or Latin America where informal sector enterprises
are strongly incorporated into the formal economy through subcontracting arrangements,
often competing with formal sector firms in production. For example, in Kelley’s 1994
study, his findings that the Peruvian informal sector competes with the formal sector and
reduces the spending multiplier rest on the assumption of sufficiently strong elasticities
in substitution between formal and informal output. However, this assumption may be
less applicable to countries in Africa or South Asia where informal sector production is
concentrated in wage goods or commerce and cannot easily substitute for formal sector
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production. Therefore, extending structuralist analysis to these economies may allow for
a complementary relationship between the formal and informal sectors to exist.
In addition, current theoretical work on the informal sector tends to model the interplay
between informal-formal sector dualism and international competition in a simplistic man-
ner. Specifically, this literature has downplayed international trade with the assumption
that informal sector participants do not export. While the assumption is empirically ro-
bust, these models fail to consider the role of international competition in tempering formal
exporting firms’ pricing behavior. Such international competition may force formal sector
firms to reduce prices to preserve market shares and create macroeconomic adjustment
based on changing relative prices between the formal and informal sectors.
Therefore, in response to limitations in current work on the informal sector, this paper
develops a two-sector, structuralist, macroeconomic model designed to determine the effect
of urban informal sector activity on growth policy and income distribution. The existence
of informal sector activity in the model rests on inadequate demand in the formal sector.
To make the model applicable to an economy where the informal sector is concentrated
in the production of wage goods or commercial services, the model includes a number
of stylized facts from Schaefer’s (2001) empirical analysis of the urban informal sector in
Johannesburg, South Africa. Additionally, to incorporate international competitiveness
considerations, the model assumes that formal sector firms set prices based on a flexible
mark-up factor over variable costs, allowing formal sector producers to squeeze profits in
order to maintain market shares in the world economy.3
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1.1 A South African Case Study
This section presents some empirical evidence on the informal sector in Johannesburg,
South Africa to be used as stylized facts incorporated into the model in the next sec-
tion. In particular, empirical evidence on formal-informal sector linkages, informal sector
labor supply, access to capital in the informal sector, and formal sector pricing behav-
ior are discussed. The empirical information is drawn from Schaefer’s (2001) analysis
of cross-sectional survey data collected by the World Bank’s 1999 Greater Johannesburg
Metropolitan Area study.4 This survey includes data on 500 informal sector firms, defined
as firms not formally registered, and 328 large formal manufacturing firms, defined as firms
formally registered and having more than 50 employees.
Johannesburg, South Africa, was chosen as a case study for this paper for three reasons.
First, the Johannesburg informal sector exemplifies the type of informal sector seen in many
areas of Africa or South Asia where informal firms have relatively weak forward linkages to
the formal sector. Second, in the post-Apartheid era, South Africa has transitioned from
a relatively closed economy to one that is more open to international trade, exposing long-
protected formal firms to foreign competition (Chandra et al., 2000a). Third, for a number
of institutional and structural reasons, the urban informal sector in South Africa is poised
to expand rapidly in the future, yet little analysis has been done on the macroeconomic
implications of a growing informal sector. In fact, in the post-Apartheid policy debate
over how to meet the challenges of extreme income inequality, unemployment, poverty and
international competition, the distributional effects of urban informal sector activity have
largely been ignored.
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1.1.1 Some stylized facts
As shown in Table 1, one stylized fact about the Johannesburg informal sector is that
firms have relatively weak forward linkages to the formal sector. Only 20.2 percent of
informal sector firms reported selling their output to small formal sector firms and less
than 5 percent reported selling output to large formal sector firms or foreign buyers. This
data is consistent with the literature on African informal sectors that describe them as
concentrated in the production of low-wage goods or services targeted to the domestic
economy (Meagher, 1995).
Insert Table 1
A second stylized fact about the Johannesburg informal sector is that the majority of
participants engage in informal sector activity due to formal sector unemployment. Table
2 shows that 51.6 percent of informal sector business owners reported started their busi-
ness for this reason while only 9.1 percent indicated profit opportunities as their primary
motivation. Hence, the Johannesburg evidence confirms the common structuralist view
that the majority of informal sector participants are there as a residual labor force.
Insert Table 2
Within the Johannesburg informal sector, it is also evident that not all participants
may have equal access to resources. To illustrate this point, Schaefer (2001) divided the
Johannesburg informal sector into two classes based on a combination of monthly sales and
start-up capital requirements.5 For example, Table 3 shows the level of capital required to
start-up business by monthly sales range and shows that more than 50 percent of owners
in the lowest two sales ranges (i.e., 1 to 1500 Rands) had start-up capital requirements of
6
1000 Rands or less. However, once an owner is in the third sales range (i.e., 1501 to 3000
Rands), he/she is more likely to have had a start-up capital requirement of more than 1000
Rands. In Schaefer (2001), informal sector owners who needed to secure more than 1000
Rands in start-up capital were thus defined as “entrepreneurs” and informal sector owners
who could commence business with 1000 Rands or less were defined as “laborers”.
Insert Table 3
Using Schaefer’s (2001) class division, Tables 4 and 5 suggest that informal sector
participants have different skills and access to infrastructure. In Table 4, all informal
sector participants appear to be relatively unskilled. However, while over three-fourths of
the labor class have no vocational qualification and only 20 percent are skilled or semi-
skilled, 59 percent of those in the entrepreneurial class have no vocational qualification and
29 percent are skilled or semi-skilled. In Table 5, roughly 25 percent fewer informal sector
owners in the labor class have access to their own transport, water, and electricity than do
those in the entrepreneurial class.
Insert Tables 4 and 5
Finally, data on large formal sector firms in Johannesburg illustrate that certain sector
asymmetries may exist between the formal and informal sectors. One important asymmetry
regards capacity utilization. Table 6 shows capacity utilization measures for large formal
firms. For both 1997 and 1998, less than 10 percent of firms reported producing at full
capacity and, for those producing with excess capacity, the average increase in output they
could produce was over 40 percent. Additionally, only 37 percent of large formal firms
operated a double or triple labor shift in either year. Conversely, when informal sector
participants were asked the number of days they worked per month, 95 percent of informal
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sector firms reported working more than 20 days a month (indicating a response broadly
consistent with a double or triple shift).6
Insert Table 6
The sector asymmetry in capacity utilization suggests that pricing behavior between
the sectors may also be different. While it is often assumed that informal sector firms
operate in perfectly competitive markets with flexible prices (Webster and Fidler, 1996),
formal sector firms in South Africa are faced with a significant degree of unionization in
the labor market that could create a wage rigidity. In fact, more than 90 percent of large
formal firms reported working with one or more unions and 85 percent reported having a
collective agreement with their workers (Chandra et al., 2000a). This data is consistent
with Gibson and Van Seventer (1995) who assume the existence of mark-up pricing in the
formal sector due to concentration in industry, the less-than-full capacity utilization rates
of formal firms, and the extent of unionization of the formal sector labor market.
2 The Open-Economy Model
This section constructs a short-run, two-sector, open-economy, structuralist macroeconomic
model with an urban informal sector. Structuralist refers to the modeling framework
of Taylor (1983) and (1991) and is based on the acknowledgement that an economy’s
structure, as determined by its history, institutions, and political context, makes some
patterns of resource allocation more likely than others. In order to illustrate these factors
and determine causal linkages, a modeling methodology is needed. However, the focus in
this section is on the basic intuition of the model and its policy implications. A more
detailed discussion of the mathematical derivations is provided in the appendix.
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To address policy implications, the model is used to examine the informal sector’s effects
on capacity utilization and income distribution when either a policy of export-led growth
or trade liberalization is pursued. An export-led growth strategy is examined by con-
ducting comparative static analysis of a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate. Trade
liberalization is indirectly examined by analyzing a reduction in formal sector producer’s
monopoly power resulting from increased exposure to international competition. While
trade liberalization leads to a wide array of changes within an economy, this paper exam-
ines a reduction in monopoly power because it is directly linked to questions of income
distribution and is appropriate in South Africa, where long protected firms are now being
exposed to international competition.7
2.1 Assumptions
The economy consists of two sectors, a formal sector and an urban informal sector. In ac-
cordance with the Johannesburg stylized facts, urban informal sector production is assumed
to be concentrated in wage goods or commercial services with weak forward linkages to the
formal sector or foreign markets. As such, the major market for informal sector goods is
domestic, low-income consumer groups. Output in the informal sector is:
Xn = Cfn + Cnn (1)
where Xn is the quantity of informal sector goods and Cin is the quantity of informal sector
goods consumed by sector i with (i = f, n).
The informal sector is further characterized as consisting of two classes of participants.
One class, which can be called “entrepreneurs,” consists of individuals who occupy more
lucrative activities and have capital. The other class, which can be called “labor,” consists
of marginal owner-operators. Barriers to entry into the entrepreneurial class could be
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based on factors such as start-up capital requirements, necessary skills, access to loans and
infrastructure, gender, and subcontracting networks. With both classes of informal sector
participants assumed to be producing the same good, total informal sector output is the
sum of the outputs of each group:
Xn = Xne +Xnw (1′)
where Xne is the quantity of informal sector output produced by entrepreneurs and Xnw
is the quantity of informal sector output produced by workers (the “labor” class).
Unlike the informal sector, the formal sector produces a wide variety of capital and con-
sumption goods and exports a portion of its output. With formal sector exports assumed
to consist primarily of industrial or manufactured goods,8 output in the formal sector can
be written as:
Xf = Cff + Cnf + gfKf + gnKn + E (2)
where Xf is the quantity of formal sector goods, Cif is the quantity of formal sector goods
consumed by sector i, Kj is the sectoral capital stock (fixed in the short run), and gj refers
to the capital accumulation rate in sector j. Due to the industrial nature of the good,
formal sector exports are assumed to be nationally differentiated facing a demand with a
positive and finite price elasticity of ψ. This yields the following export demand function,
in which the constant term A > 0 incorporates exogenously determined foreign income
effects:9
E = Aqψ (3)
Regarding the informal sector labor market, wage employment is not modeled and
instead both classes of informal sector participants are assumed for simplicity to be self-
employed.10 However, to reflect the existence of barriers to entry into the entrepreneurial
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class, it is assumed that the supply of informal sector entrepreneurs is fixed in the short
run and only the entrepreneurs in the informal sector have access to capital. Thus, the
output-capital ratio in the informal sector, xn, must refer to the level of output produced
by entrepreneurs, Xne, divided by the capital stock owned by entrepreneurs, Kn.
xn = Xne/Kn (4)
Economy-wide, full employment in the labor market is assumed and total labor is
divided between formal sector and informal sector workers.11 The total labor supply, L, is
fixed in the short run. Consistent with the Johannesburg stylized facts, once output and
labor demand in the formal sector are determined, excess labor is employed in the informal
sector as a residual labor force. With Liw referring to demand for workers in sector i and
biw referring to the fixed technical labor coefficient in sector i, labor market equilibrium
can be defined by:
L = Lfw + Lnw (5)
with
Lfw = bfwXf (6)
Lnw = bnwXnw (7)
Prices in the two sectors are the sum of variable costs and profits. In the informal sector,
labor earns an implicit real wage, wn/Pn, in terms of their own good that is exogenously
determined by the productivity of their labor, wn/Pn = 1/bnw. Thus, prices in the informal
sector are:12
Pn = wnbnw (8)
However, entrepreneurs are assumed to be more productive than labor because entrepreneurs
have access to capital. Given their greater labor productivity, and the assumption of an
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equal implicit wage rate on their labor time, informal sector entrepreneurs earn positive
implicit profits. With rne defined as informal sector entrepreneur’s rate of profit:
Pn = wnbne + rnePf/xn (8′)
In contrast to the informal sector, formal sector workers are assumed to earn an institu-
tionally fixed nominal wage, wf , set by union-management bargaining. Regarding imported
intermediates, formal sector producers are assumed to face constraints such as skills or in-
frastructure that limit their ability to supply adequate inputs for import substitution.13
To capture the structural dependency on intermediate imports, the formal sector import
coefficient af is assumed to be fixed. Excluding tariffs and subsidies for simplicity, formal
sector prices can be expressed as:
Pf = wfbfw + Pwmeaf + rfkPf/xf (9)
where e is the nominal exchange rate in domestic currency per unit of foreign currency
(a policy variable that is fixed in the short run), Pwm is the world price of imported
intermediates, rfk is the profit rate for formal sector capitalists, and xf is the output-
capital ratio in the formal sector:
xf = Xf/Kf (10)
In terms of supply, the stylized facts for Johannesburg suggest that the formal sector
operates at less-than-full capacity, with rigidities in prices due to oligopolistic firms that
could employ mark-up pricing. With excess capacity and mark-up pricing, the output-
capital ratio in the formal sector, xf , acts as the adjusting variable to achieve equilibrium
and xf is an endogenous variable. Formal sector firms set their prices by using a mark-up
factor, τ > 1, over variable costs:
Pf = τ(wfbfw + Pwmeaf ) (11)
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Defining pi = rfk/xf as the profit share of total formal sector income and substituting pi
and equation (9) into equation (11) yields:
pi = (τ − 1)/τ (12)
with a corresponding wage share of gross output as:
wfbfw/Pf = (1− pi)(1− φ)
where φ is defined as the share of imported intermediates in domestic unit variable costs:
φ =
ePwmaf
wfbfw+ePwmaf
(13)
Under the small country assumption, the foreign price of manufactured goods, Pwx,
and the world prices of imported intermediates, Pwm, are exogenously fixed. Due to the
assumption of nationally differentiated exports, however, the law of one price need not
hold. Therefore, the domestic price of formal sector exports, Pf , is not constrained to
equal the world export price. Nevertheless, formal sector pricing is affected by international
competitive pressures as formal sector firms attempt to maintain their market shares in
world trade. To accommodate this price responsiveness, the formal sector mark-up factor
is assumed to be partially flexible. However, formal sector prices are not flexible enough
to clear markets and some quantity adjustment is still required. Following Blecker (1989)
and Blecker & Seguino (2002), the mark-up factor adjusts to international competition
according to the following constant-elasticity function:
τ = τ(
ePwx
Pf
)θ = τqθ (14)
where τ > 1 is the constant target mark-up factor, θ > 0 is the constant elasticity of the
actual mark-up factor with respect to the relative price of foreign competing goods, and q
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is the real exchange rate defined as:
q = ePwx/Pf (15)
To illustrate how formal sector firms try to maintain international competitiveness,
equation (11) can be substituted into equation (14) to yield:
τ = τ1/(1+θ)θ/(1+θ) (14′)
where for notational convenience,  is defined as the ratio of the price of foreign export-
competing goods to the unit average variable costs of domestic export goods and serves as
a measure of international competitiveness:
 = qτ = ePwxwfbf+ePwmaf (16)
If formal sector wages were to rise, then the country’s international competitiveness would
suffer (i.e.,  would fall), and in order to maintain market shares in international trade,
domestic firms would decrease (“squeeze”) their profit margins.
Unlike the formal sector, the informal sector is assumed to operate at full capacity with
competitive, price-taking firms. Therefore, in the informal sector, prices are the adjusting
variable and xn is exogenously fixed. The informal sector relative price z is defined as:
z = Pn/Pf (17)
In terms of consumption, there are three social classes which are assumed to have
different propensities to spend and save. Formal sector capitalists earn profit income and
are assumed to spend with a marginal propensity to consume of γfk with (0 < γfk < 1).
Informal sector entrepreneurs earn a net product (i.e. the sum of their implicit wages
and profits) and are assumed to spend with a marginal propensity to consume of γne with
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(0 < γne < 1).14 Formal and informal sector workers earn wage income and, for simplicity,
are assumed to spend all of their income on consumption.
Following Taylor (1991), total nominal consumer spending by all three social classes
can be defined as D, where:
D = wfLfw + γfkrfkPfKf + γnePnxnKn + wnLnw (18)
The ratio of D to the population, N , which is assumed to be fixed in the short run, yields
per capita nominal consumption, Y :
Y = D/N (19)
Then, defining the sectoral relative capital stock as:
λ = Kn/Kf (20)
per capita nominal consumption can be shown to be a positive function of the two endoge-
nous variables xf and z: Y = Y (xf , z) with Yxf > 0 and Yz > 0.
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Sectoral consumption can be expressed through the following four equations in which
PjCij represents consumption by sector i of sector j′s good, β represents the uniform share
of consumption expenditures on informal sector goods, and (1− β) represents the share of
consumption expenditures on formal sector goods.
PfCff = (1− β)[wfLfw + γfkrfkPfKf ] (21)
PnCfn = β[wfLfw + γfkrfkPfKf ] (22)
PfCnf = (1− β)[γnePnxnKn + wnLnw] (23)
PnCnn = β[γnePnxnKn + wnLnw] (24)
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As with per capita consumer spending, these four sectoral consumption equations can
be reduced to functions of the two endogenous variables, xf and z. Moreover, it is assumed
that the sectoral budget share for informal sector goods, β itself is endogenously determined
by per capita consumption and sectoral relative prices:
β = β(Y, z) (25)
Thus, total demand for each good can be expressed simply as total nominal consumer
spending times the sectoral budget share:
Pn(Cfn + Cnn) = β(Y, z)D = β[Y (xf , z), z]D
Pf (Cff + Cnf ) = [1− β(Y, z)]D = [1− β(Y (xf , z), z)]D
The above two equations illustrate that a change in either xf or z will induce a change in
per capita consumption, Y , through changes in income. This effect is akin to the principle
of income elasticity of demand. A change in Y will then result in a change in the relative
demand for each good, through a change in the sectoral budget share. Given that informal
sector goods in the types of economies being modelled here are typically staple goods or
manufactured goods of a lesser quality, it is assumed that a rise in income reduces the
informal sector budget share. As such, the elasticity of the sectoral budget share with
respect to a change in per capita income, βY , is assumed to be negative:16
βY = (η − 1)β/Y < 0
with η as a constant parameter and (0 < η < 1).
In addition, it is assumed that as z rises and the income of informal sector participants
increases, there is the tendency for informal sector consumption to rise by relatively less
in accordance with the negative income elasticity of β. However, changes in z produce not
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only income effects for the sectoral budget share, but also relative price effects as a rising
z translates into more expensive informal sector goods. If βzYz < 0 represents the income
effect of a change in z and βzp represents the price effect of a change in z, then βz is the
total elasticity of the sectoral budget share with respect to a change in z:
βz = βzYz + βzp = (1− ν)β/z
with ν as a constant parameter.
The elasticity βz is not assumed to have any particular magnitude at this time. It is
possible that as z rises and informal sector goods become more expensive, consumption
shifts toward formal sector goods through substitution. In this case, both the price effect
and income effect induced by a rise in z translate into a lower informal sector budget
share and ν > 1 (i.e. the case of a price-elastic budget share). However, in the case of a
sufficiently price-inelastic budget share, ν < 1.17
Regarding imports, only the formal sector is assumed to purchase imported capital
with perfectly price-inelastic demand. For simplicity, it is also assumed that there are no
imports of consumption goods. With gfm representing the growth rate of imported capi-
tal, gfmKf representing the quantity of imported investment goods, and Pwi representing
the exogenously determined world price of imported capital goods, total import demand
expressed in terms of domestic formal sector output is:
M = (ePwmafXf + ePwigfmKf )/Pf (26)
Following Blecker & Seguino (2002), imported investment goods are assumed to be a fixed
proportion µf of home investment goods (gfKf ) such that:18
gfmKf = µfgfKf (27)
Using this assumption, equation (26) becomes:
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M = qρmafXf + qρiµfgfKf (26′)
where ρi is the relative world price of imported capital to exports:
ρi = Pwi/Pwx (28)
and ρm is the relative world price of imported intermediates (i.e. raw materials) to exports:
ρm = Pwm/Pwx (29)
Turning to the specification of investment demand, informal sector investment is as-
sumed to be determined residually by informal sector savings:19
gn = (1− γne)xnz (30)
The formal sector, on the other hand, has an independent investment demand function.
Borrowing from the structuralist models of Marglin & Bhaduri (1990) and Gibson and
Van Seventer (1995), formal sector investment demand is assumed to depend on the level
of autonomous investment (reflecting Keynesian “animal spirits”), gf , the profit share, pi,
and the accelerator effect, xf :20
gf (qρiµf + 1) = gf + g1pi + g2xf (31)
Finally, balance of payments is modeled simply as net exports plus net foreign capital
outflows, F , where the latter are assumed to be endogenous:
F = E −M (32)
Then, following from equation (31), the equation specifying equilibrium between total
investment and total saving (i.e. the goods market equilibrium condition) can be defined:
gfKf + F = (1− γfk)rfkKf (33)
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In accordance with the assumption of no intersectoral capital flows, there is no sectoral
trade balance term in the investment equal to savings equilibrium condition. Therefore,
this equilibrium condition represents equality between planned investment and realized
savings in the formal sector only.
All the equations necessary to complete the model have been specified. The equations
and variables of the model are listed in Tables 7 and 8. The solution of the model is
obtained by reducing it to two independent, simultaneous, equations in the endogenous
variables xf and z using the investment-saving equilibrium and the informal sector goods
market equilibrium:21
Insert Tables 7 and 8
Using investment equal to savings equilibrium, the variable z does not enter into equa-
tion (33) such that an explicit solution for the equilibrium level of formal sector output,
x∗f , can be derived:
x∗f =
(gf+g1pi)Rf+A/Kf (qψ)
(1−γfk)pi+qρmaf−g2Rf (34)
where (1 − γfk)pi + qρmaf − g2Rf > 0 for Keynesian goods-market stability. Also, for
notational simplicity, Rf = (1− qρiµf )/(qρiµf + 1), is the ratio of domestically purchased
investment goods minus imported investment goods to total investment purchases, and
0 < Rf < 1.
Equation (34) can be plotted in (xf×z) space and is called the “IS Curve.” As reflected
in Figure 1, the IS curve has a zero slope, showing that the investment-savings equilibrium
condition for the formal sector goods market is independent of the sectoral terms of trade
and occurs at a level, x∗f > 0, which is determined only by conditions in the formal sector.
The model’s structure is thus a recursive one in that the level of formal sector output is
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determined within the formal sector, and (given the level of formal sector output) informal
sector activity acts only to determine sectoral relative prices, the share of informal sector
goods vs. formal sector goods consumed by participants throughout the economy, and the
real wage in both sectors.22
Insert Figure 1
Using informal sector goods market equilibrium, equation (1) can be re-written to
express excess demand equal to zero in the informal sector:
(βxf/z)[(1−pi)(1−φ)+piγfk]−(1−βγne)xnλ−(1−β)[L/(Kfbnw)−xfbfw/bnw] = 0 (35)
Equation (35) plotted in (xf × z) space is called the “NN Curve.” The intuition for a
positively sloped NN curve lies in the fact that as formal sector output rises, some of the
increased formal sector income is injected into the informal sector such that excess demand
is created in the informal sector goods market. To eliminate the excess demand, informal
sector relative prices must rise.23
Note, however, that as z rises, some of the increased informal sector income is leaked
back to the formal sector, creating a positive feedback effect. The steepness of the NN
curve depends partially on the magnitude of this leakage from the informal sector back to
the formal sector, a magnitude that is positively related to the price and income elasticities
of β. For example, when β is both income and price inelastic, the slope of the NN curve
is relatively flat because increases in xf and z do not lead to significant substitution in
consumption away from informal sector goods (left panel of Figure 1). And, when β is
both income and price elastic, the slope of the NN curve is relatively steep yielding an
equilibrium level z∗2 for any given x∗f that is relatively lower than the equilibrium level z
∗
1
with an income and price inelastic β (right panel of Figure 1).
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2.2 A Devaluation Of The Nominal Exchange Rate
One export-led growth policy commonly employed in South Africa is a nominal devaluation.
Equation (14′) verifies that a nominal devaluation encourages exports in this model through
an improvement in international competitiveness, , which in turn allows formal sector
producers to increase their actual mark-up factor, τ . A nominal devaluation also means,
however, that imported intermediate goods are more expensive for formal sector producers.
Consequently, both the rise in τ and the increase in imported intermediate costs translate
into higher formal sector prices. Nevertheless, despite the rise in Pf , a nominal devaluation
also leads to a rise in the real exchange rate, q, because the formal sector mark-up factor
does not rise by enough to offset the rise in cost competitiveness, .
Therefore, a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate affects formal sector output and
informal sector relative prices through three channels: (1) the rise in e leads to a rise in
the actual mark-up factor, τ , and hence an increase in the formal sector profit share, pi,
creating a class redistribution of income; (2) the rise in e translates into a depreciation of
the real exchange rate, q; and (3) the rise in formal sector prices, Pf , results in a direct
increase in formal sector purchasing power over informal sector goods. The overall effect
of a nominal devaluation on x∗f and z
∗ is, thus, ambiguous and depends on which of these
channels carries the strongest impact.
For the first channel, an increase in the formal sector profit share stimulates formal
sector investment demand given that g1 > 0. However, a rise in pi also entails income
redistribution toward formal sector capitalists who have a lower marginal propensity to
consume than formal sector workers. Due to this redistribution of income, total formal
sector consumption falls and investment demand is decreased through the accelerator effect,
given that g2 > 0. Under the assumptions of this model, the effect of the fall in consumption
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demand dominates the effect of the rise in profitability.24 Thus, a nominal devaluation has a
contractionary effect on formal sector output through its contractionary effect on domestic
absorption.
For the second channel, a higher q raises export demand as determined by the price
elasticity ψ, increases the cost of imported intermediate goods, and lowers the share of
investment income devoted to domestically produced investment goods, Rf . Assuming
that exports are sufficiently price-elastic, a depreciation of the real exchange rate has the
net effect of improving the trade balance (i.e. E-M).25 Thus, a nominal devaluation has an
expansionary effect on formal sector output through its expansionary effect on net export
demand.
Overall, if the increase in net exports is relatively small, then the contractionary effects
of a higher pi on domestic absorption will dominate the expansionary effects of a higher q
on the trade balance. In this case, a nominal devaluation reduces the equilibrium level of
formal sector output, x∗f , and the economy is said to be stagnationist.
26 On the other hand,
if the increase in net exports is sufficiently high, then the gain in external competitiveness
will raise the trade balance more than enough to compensate for the loss in domestic
absorption. Under these conditions, a nominal devaluation raises the equilibrium level of
formal sector output and the economy is said to be “exhilarationist.”27
While the existing literature has described stagnationist and exhilarationist economies,
the more interesting results of this model pertain to the informal sector. In terms of
informal sector equilibrium prices, a nominal devaluation translates into higher formal
sector prices and initially improves formal sector purchasing power over informal sector
goods (the third channel). This purchasing power effect, called the “PPE”, increases
demand in the informal sector goods market, pressuring informal sector relative prices
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to rise. However, the increase in pi and resulting redistribution of income effect, called
the “RIE”, lowers the formal sector marginal propensity to consume and decreases formal
sector demand for informal sector goods (the first channel). The rise in e also increases
the share of imported intermediates in unit variable costs, φ, through a rise in the real
exchange rate, q (the second channel). With a rise in φ, the formal sector wage share is
decreased and, through its impact on formal sector consumption, further reduces demand
for informal sector goods. Finally, in addition to the direct effects of a rise in e on z∗, a
nominal devaluation indirectly affects the informal sector goods market through its impact
on x∗f .
Insert Figure 2
Figure 2 roughly summarizes the different channels by which a nominal devaluation
impacts the equilibrium levels of formal sector output and informal sector relative prices.
As stated earlier, the net effect is ambiguous and depends on which of these channels carries
the strongest impact. If the formal sector is stagnationist, as shown in Figure 3, then a
nominal devaluation lowers x∗f and the IS curve shifts down to IS
′. Regarding informal
sector relative prices, however, there are two possibilities for the new equilibrium level z∗′ .
For example, if the RIE is relatively strong, then the combined impact of the RIE and the
higher φ decrease formal sector demand for informal sector goods despite the PPE. As a
result, the NN curve shifts left to NN′ (left panel of Figure 3). Compounding this leftward
shift, the fall in x∗f lowers formal sector demand for informal sector goods as illustrated by
the movement along the NN′ to z∗′1 . In this case, a nominal devaluation depresses economy-
wide income and increased exports come at the cost of worsened income inequality within
the formal sector as well as between the formal and informal sectors.
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Insert Figure 3
On the other hand, if the RIE is sufficiently weak, then the PPE could be strong enough
to raise formal sector demand for informal sector goods, despite the RIE and higher φ. As a
result, the NN curve shifts right to NN′ (right panel of Figure 3). Moreover, if the rightward
shift in the NN curve is larger than the downward shift in the IS curve, then demand is
raised in the informal sector goods market, despite the lower x∗f . In this case, z
∗ actually
rises to z∗′2 . Thus, in a stagnationist economy with a weak RIE, a nominal devaluation
could theoretically increase both exports and informal sector incomes. However, export
expansion is accompanied by a decrease in formal sector incomes and worsened income
inequality between formal sector capitalists and workers.
Insert Figure 4
Figure 4 illustrates a nominal devaluation in an exhilarationist economy. As the figure
shows, a nominal devaluation raises formal sector equilibrium output and the IS curve shifts
up to IS′. Following the same intuition as above, if the RIE is weak, then the NN curve
shifts right to NN′ due to the positive effect of the PPE on informal sector demand (right
panel of Figure 4). Compounding the rightward shift in the NN curve, the higher level
of x∗f raises demand in the informal sector goods market, as illustrated by the movement
along the NN′ curve to z∗′2 . In this case, a nominal devaluation truly succeeds in achieving
export-led expansion because it raises both formal and informal sector incomes.
If the RIE is sufficiently strong, however, then the NN curve shifts left to NN′ (left
panel of Figure 4). And, if the leftward shift in the NN curve is larger than the upward
shift in the IS curve, then z∗ falls to z∗′1 . In this case, export-led growth is achieved for
the formal sector, but informal sector participants suffer from a loss in purchasing power
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over formal sector goods. As such, in an exhilarationist economy with a strong RIE, the
burden of macroeconomic adjustment is partially shifted away from formal sector workers
onto informal sector participants due to a conflictive relationship between the formal and
informal sectors.
2.3 A Fall In The Formal Sector Target Mark-Up Factor
Due to South Africa’s opening up to international trade, and the corresponding trade
liberalization policies that have been implemented, it is possible that the formal sector
target mark-up factor of domestic firms has been lowered. When formal sector producers
experience a decrease in their monopoly power, then τ falls, creating a fall in τ as well.
Similar to a nominal devaluation, a fall in the formal sector target mark-up factor affects
formal sector output and informal sector relative prices through three channels: (1) the
fall in τ leads to a fall in the actual mark-up factor, τ , and hence the formal sector profit
share, pi, creating a class redistribution of income; (2) the fall in τ results in a fall in formal
sector prices, Pf , and a depreciation of the real exchange rate, q; and (3) the fall in formal
sector prices results in a direct decrease in formal sector purchasing power over informal
sector goods.
Insert Figure 5
The effect of a reduction in τ on the trade balance follows directly from the intuition
for a nominal devaluation. However, as shown in Figure 5, the effect of a reduction in the
formal sector profit share is to increase domestic absorption, increase formal sector output
in equilibrium, and make the economy unambiguously stagnationist. Regarding demand in
the informal sector, the positive RIE effect on formal sector consumption works in contrast
to the initial decrease in formal sector purchasing power over informal sector goods. Thus,
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for informal sector relative prices to fall in response to a reduction in τ , the PPE must
be large enough to outweigh the expansionary effects of both the RIE and the higher x∗f
on demand for informal sector goods. Where trade liberalization leads to a reduction in
formal sector monopoly power in an economy with large class differences in consumption,
the model therefore suggests that income in both sectors would likely grow and income
distribution within and between sectors would improve.
3 Synthesis And Conclusions
This paper constructed a two-sector macroeconomic model designed to incorporate the
structural factors present in Johannesburg, South Africa (and most likely present in other
urban areas of Africa or South Asia) and, as such, extends formal-informal sector dual
analysis beyond Latin America. Specifically, the model captures an informal sector that
expands as a result of inadequate formal sector demand and produces wage goods or com-
mercial services targeted toward domestic low-income consumers. The model includes
open-economy considerations by adding a formal sector mark-up factor endogenously de-
termined by international competitiveness. This addition is useful for depicting sectoral
price adjustment and for creating the possibility of growth in both sectors. As such, the
model not only allows for either a complementary or conflictive relationship to exist be-
tween the formal and informal sectors, but it makes explicit the factors that determine the
nature of this relationship.
For example, the comparative statics for a nominal devaluation illustrated that export-
led growth occurs only under certain conditions. In an exhilarationist economy, a nominal
devaluation succeeds at achieving export-led growth in the formal sector. However, for
informal sector incomes to grow, the higher profit share resulting from the devaluation must
26
translate into a relatively small reduction in formal sector consumption demand for informal
sector goods (i.e. the RIE must be small). If the RIE is relatively large, then a nominal
devaluation decreases demand in the informal sector and export-led growth in the formal
sector is accompanied by a contraction in informal sector incomes and worsened income
inequality both within the formal sector as well as between the formal and informal sectors.
The trade-off between formal and informal sector incomes illustrates that a conflictive
relationship could exist between the sectors in response to a higher profit share.
If the economy is stagnationist, a nominal devaluation is contractionary because the
resulting fall in domestic absorption outweighs the gains from an improved trade balance.
As such, a nominal devaluation succeeds in promoting exports, but fails to increase ca-
pacity utilization. Furthermore, when the RIE is strong, the formal sector contraction is
accompanied by a deterioration in informal sector incomes such that it may be better to
instead implement policies that raise the formal sector wage share.
One way in which the formal sector wage share could be increased is through a lower
target mark-up factor. With a lower target mark-up factor, the real exchange rate depre-
ciates and, assuming adequate elasticities, the trade balance is improved. Coupled with a
trade balance improvement, domestic absorption increases, and assuming an adequate RIE,
demand is raised in both sectors. Thus, irrespective of whether an economy is stagnationist
in response to a nominal exchange rate, a lower target mark-up factor is likely to increase
formal sector output, increase informal sector relative prices, increase net exports, and
improve income distribution both within the formal sector as well as between the sectors.
In the case of South Africa, it is likely the economy has been developing more exhilara-
tionist possibilities since 1994 when the country started opening up further to international
trade. South African formal sector producers are now exposed to significant international
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competition suggesting a small degree of exchange-rate pass through, while at the same
time, they are hedged on their import costs (Chandra et al., 2000a). Therefore, when South
Africans try to pursue export-led growth through nominal devaluation, this model suggests
they may have to grapple with the trade-off of worsened income inequality and increased
vulnerability for the poorest groups in urban society. However, contrary to current efforts
to foster export-led growth through exchange-rate policies, trade liberalization efforts may
bode well for the South Africans’ dual goals of growth and improved income distribution.
Beyond South Africa, this model highlights the need to consider class consumption
behavior before blindly advocating development policies that aim to promote informal
sector expansion in response to formal sector unemployment. If informal sector relative
prices fall during a formal sector contraction, as in the case of a nominal devaluation
with a strong RIE, income distribution could worsen between the sectors, and informal
sector participants could bear a disproportionate share of the burden. Given that the
nature of the formal-informal sector relationship is complementary when formal sector
class differences in consumption are significant (a common structural feature across many
developing countries), informal sector participants could likely suffer the greatest increase
in vulnerability during an economic crisis.
Mathematical Appendix
Per Capita Nominal Consumption
Equation (19) can be reduced to a function of xf and z by substituting in equations (5),
(8′), (12), and (18):
Y = (1/N)[wfbfwxfKf + γfkpixfPfKf + γnePnxnKn + wn(L− bfwxfKf )]
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Factoring out Kf and simplifying:
Y = (Kf/N)[xfwfbfw + xfγfkpiPf − xfwnbfw + zγnexnλPf + wnL/Kf ]
Consistent with the labor market assumptions, as xf rises, per capita consumption will rise
due to an increase in formal sector employment, which works to absorb previously employed
informal sector workers. As workers who were previously employed in the informal sector,
earning a nominal wage of wn, get absorbed into the formal sector they earn a higher
nominal wage of wf and overall income and consumption rise. Additionally, as z rises, per
capita consumption rises through increased informal sector income. As such, Yxf > 0 and
Yz > 0.
Derivation of the Model Solution
To derive the model solution, equation (1) and equation (33) can be expressed in the form
of excess demand equal to zero. In equation (33), the term Kf can be divided from both
sides and equations (3), (15), (26′) and (32) can be substituted in to yield:
(gf + g1pi)Rf +A/Kf (qψ) + xf [g2Rf − (1− γfk)pi − qρmaf ] = 0
For excess demand to equal zero in the informal sector goods market, the term Kf can be
divided from both sides of equation (1), equations (1′), (4), (5), (12), (20), (22) and (24)
can be substituted in to yield:
(β/Pn)[wfbfwxf + γfkpixfPf + γnePnxnλ+ wn(L/Kf − bfwxf )]
−xnλ− (1/bnw)[L/Kf − bfwxf )] = 0
Then, substituting in equations (7), (9), and (17):
(βxf/z)[(1− pi)(1− φ) + piγfk]− (1− βγne)xnλ− (1− β)[L/(Kfbnw)− xfbfw/bnw] = 0
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The NN Curve
Recalling that β = β(xf , z) is endogenous, the slope of the NN curve is:
dxf
dz |NN = −N2/N1 > 0
where
N1 = (β/z)[(1− pi)(1− φ) + piγfk] + (1− β)(bfw/bnw)
+(βxfxf/z)[(1− pi)(1− φ) + piγfk] + βxfγnexnλ+ βxf [L/(Kfbnw)− xfbfw/bnw] > 0
N2 = −βxf [(1− pi)(1− φ) + piγfk](1/z2)
+(βzxf/z)[(1− pi)(1− φ) + piγfk] + βzγnexnλ+ βz[L/(Kfbnw)− xfbfw/bnw] < 0
The first term in N1 is positive and represents an injection into the informal sector
resulting from increased formal sector consumption as xf rises. The second term in N1 is
positive and represents an injection into the informal sector resulting from the correspond-
ing rise in formal sector employment. Specifically, with each unit rise in xf , fewer workers
are left as residual labor in the informal sector and informal sector consumption of formal
sector goods is reduced. The third, fourth, and fifth terms in N1 are the weighted income
effects from xf on the informal sector budget shares and are negative to correspond with
equation (25). These income effects act as a leakage from the informal sector, because
with each unit increase in xf , per capita consumption rises, but the informal sector budget
share falls due to the staple or lesser quality nature of informal sector goods.
To determine the sign of N1, it is necessary to determine whether, for any given change
in xf , informal sector injections are greater than informal sector leakages or vice versa. It
seems reasonable to assume that the direct change in informal sector consumption resulting
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from a unit rise in xf (i.e. the injections) will exceed the indirect change in informal
sector consumption resulting from a percentage change in the informal sector budget share
induced by a unit rise in xf (i.e. the income effect leakages). This assumption assures that
as xf rises, there will always be a net injection of spending from the formal sector to the
informal sector such that N1 > 0.
The first term in N2 represents a leakage from the informal sector resulting from the
decreased purchasing power of formal sector participants as z rises. This term is negative.
The second, third, and fourth terms in N2 represent the changes in informal sector con-
sumption resulting from the impact of a change in z on the informal sector budget share.
For simplicity, these terms can be called the price effects. Both terms would be negative
if the informal sector budget share is price-elastic (i.e. an additional leakage from the
informal sector) such that β′z < 0 and ν > 1. Both terms would be positive if the informal
sector budget share is sufficiently price-inelastic (i.e. an injection from the formal sector)
such that β′z > 0 and ν < 1.
Again, it seems plausible to assume that the direct change in informal sector consump-
tion resulting from a unit rise in z (in this case the leakages) exceeds the indirect change
resulting from a percentage change in the informal sector budget share due to a unit rise
in z (i.e. the injections where ν < 1). As a result, irrespective of the price elasticity of β,
it is assumed that N2 < 0 and the slope of the NN curve is positive.
Stability of the Model Solution
Given the nonlinearity of the NN curve and the fact that β is endogenously determined
by xf and z, the model can only provide an implicit solution for the equilibrium level
of informal sector relative prices, z∗. To determine the stability of the solution, local
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stability analysis can be performed using the Taylor expansion method to obtain a linear
approximation to the nonlinear system. In reduced form, this linearization is as follows: dxf
dz
−
 [g2Rf − (1− γfk)pi − qρmaf ] 0
N1 N2

 xf
z
 =
 0
0

where the Jacobian matrix is evaluated at the equilibrium. As discussed in Chiang (1984),
local stability is determined by examining the signs of the determinant and trace of this
Jacobian matrix. Specifically, stability requires that the determinant of the Jacobian,
| J |= [g2Rf − (1 − γfk)pi − qρmaf ]N2, is positive and the trace of the Jacobian, trJ =
[g2Rf − (1− γfk)pi− qρmaf ] +N2 is negative. Given the assumptions regarding the slopes
of the IS and NN curves, the equilibrium is locally stable.
Comparative Statics
Mathematically, the solution for a unit change in e on xf is obtained by differentiating
equation (34) with respect to e:
dxf
de =
Ge
[(1−γfk)pi+qρmaf−g2Rf ]2
where
Ge = [g1Rf (den)− (1− γfk)(num)](dpi/de) + (A/Kf )(den)(dqψ/de)
−(ρmaf )(num)(dq/de) + [(gf + g1pi)(den) + g2(num)](dRf/dq)(dq/de)
with den standing for the denominator, num standing for the numerator, and Table 8
listing the solutions for dq/de, dqψ/de, dpi/de, and dRf/dq.
Insert Table 9
The mathematical solution for a unit change in e on informal sector relative prices is
obtained by differentiating equation (34) with respect to e and xf :
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dz
de =
Ne
N2
− N1(dxf/de)N2
where
Ne = (βxf/z2)[(1− pi)(1− φ) + piγfk](dz/dq)(dq/de)
+(βxf/z)(1− γfk − θ)(dpi/de) + (βxf/z)(1− pi)(dφ/de)
with Table 3 listing the solutions for the partial derivatives.
The mathematical solution for a unit change in τ on xf is obtained by differentiating
equation (35) with respect to τ :
dxf
dτ =
Gτ
[(1−γfk)pi+qρmaf−g2Rf ]2 < 0
where
Gτ = [g1Rf (den)− (1− γfk)(num)](dpi/dτ) + (A/Kf )(den)(dqψ/dτ)
−(ρmaf )(num)(dq/dτ) + [(gf + g1pi)(den) + g2(num)](dRf/dq)(dq/dτ) < 0
The mathematical solution for a unit change in τ on informal sector relative prices is
obtained by differentiating equation (35) with respect to τ and xf :
dz
dτ =
Nτ
N2
− N1(dxf/dτ)N2
where
Nτ = (βxf/z2)[(1− pi)(1− φ) + piγfk](dz/dq)(dq/dτ)
+(βxf/z)(1− γfk − θ)(dpi/dτ)
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Notes
1The term “informal sector” refers to a dualistic pattern of development present in
labor-surplus economies. When capital is scarce, institutions are weak, and/or markets are
not functioning perfectly, the modern (i.e. capitalist) sector of the economy is unable to
absorb the entire labor force and there is growth in a traditional, subsistence, agricultural
sector and/or an urban, tertiary sector called the informal sector. Estimates of the informal
sector share of employment vary from thirty to forty percent in Latin America to sixty or
seventy percent in sub-Saharan Africa. See Chaudhuri (1989), Gibson et al. (1986), Harris
& Todaro (1970), Lewis (1954) or Meagher (1995).
2This view is based on the relatively capital-intensive nature of production in the for-
mal sector and disadvantages faced by informal sector producers with regard to access to
markets, public services, and infrastructure (Webster & Fidler 1996).
3For this purpose, theoretical contributions from Kelley’s (1994) model of the infor-
mal sector, Blecker’s (1989) model of international competition, Blecker’s (1996) model of
North-South international trade, and Blecker and Seguino’s (2002) model of an export-
oriented, semi-industrialized economy are used. Blecker’s (1996) model and Blecker and
Seguino’s (2002) model are built on earlier work of Dutt (1990), Taylor (1979) and (1983),
and others. The models are appropriate for this analysis since many of the asymmetries
between the formal and informal sectors are similar to those modeled in the North-South
trade literature.
4See Chandra et al. (2000a, 2000b, and 2000c).
5Schaefer (2001) discusses that the informal sector could be divided into more than two
classes but uses this grouping simply to illustrate differences in firm characteristics.
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6If 5 days a week is considered full-time, then working more than 20 days a month is
suggestive of over-time.
7However, if South Africa opens up to a lot of direct foreign investment by multinational
corporations, a new form of oligopoly power could re-emerge.
8This simplification is made to facilitate analysis of the complex fix-flex pricing frame-
work between the formal and informal sectors. In the case of South Africa, the effect of
exogenous mineral exports could be added, but the addition would not affect the analytical
structure of the model.
9This model specification is borrowed from Blecker & Seguino (2002).
10Schaefer (2001) confirms that informal sector entrepreneurs use a significant amount of
family labor or apprentices. The wide use of family or apprentice labor by informal sector
entrepreneurs allows them to pay extremely low to negligible wages or to receive free labor.
11In this sense, informal sector entrepreneurs are treated as a separate factor of pro-
duction. They are assumed to have enough capital to be self-employed, but not enough
capital to hire workers. An alternative assumption to full employment would be that to-
tal informal sector employment is fixed in the short run due to a necessary base level of
skills, allowing for the existence of unemployment as in Raychaudhuri & Chatterjee (1997).
However, the results of this model will largely remain unchanged if similar consumption
behavior is assumed for the unemployed and informal sector workers.
12Given the assumption of weak informal sector forward linkages, it is assumed that
informal sector participants do not purchase imported intermediates either.
13Chandra et al.,(2000b) show that less than one third of formal large manufacturing
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firms in Johannesburg engaged in import substitution during the Rand depreciations of
1997 and 1999. As a result of these constraints, the simplifying assumption is made that
formal sector firms are so dependent on imports of intermediate goods that their demand
for such inputs is perfectly price-inelastic.
14Empirical evidence from Chandra et al.,(2000b) shows that informal sector entrepreneurs
have poor access to bank finance and must save to invest.
15Given that the model is formalized in a fix-flex price framework, in which one of the
crucial differences between the sectors is the way that each sector adjusts to disequilibrium,
xf and z are especially helpful for showing comparative static effects.
16Embodied in βY are the income effects produced by a change in xf , holding z constant,
and vice versa. It follows that βxf = βY Yxf < 0 because as formal sector output rises,
total income rises, and informal sector consumption rises by proportionately less.
17If a rise in z fails to induce sufficient substitution in consumption toward formal sector
goods, due to the staple nature of the product, then the price effects and income effects
from a change in z work in opposite directions. For the informal sector budget share to
increase from a rise in z, the price inelasticity of the budget share must dominate the
income inelasticity of the budget share.
18Domestic investment generally consists of certain types of goods (e.g. factory buildings
or mining construction) while imported investment generally consists of other types of
goods not supplied by domestic producers (e.g. machines embodying a certain technology).
19Since the model does not include financial markets, it is assumed that capital is not
mobile between the sectors and each sector’s savings finances its own investment. When
36
examining how informal firms finance investment, generally 80 percent or more comes from
personal or family savings (Chandra et al., 2000b).
20Both of these models build on earlier work of Robinson (1962), Dutt (1984) and (1990),
and Rowthorn (1982). The investment function of Marglin & Bhaduri (1990) is an implicit
form investment function, while the one in this model is linearized. This difference has
implications for comparative statics and will be discussed in the next section.
21A third equation for equilibrium in the formal sector goods market (equation (2)) could
also be used. Given Walras’ law, however, this equation is not independent. The solution
is obtained and shown to be stable in the appendix.
22This asymmetrical influence of the formal sector on the informal sector is reminis-
cent of many North-South trade models, such as those developed by developed by Dutt
(1990), Taylor (1983), and Blecker (1996).
23A more in depth discussion of this slope is provided in the appendix.
24This result is due to the linear functional form of equation (33), representing formal
sector investment demand, along with other assumptions such as the absence of workers’
savings. For a discussion, see Marglin & Bhaduri (1990), Taylor (1990), and Blecker (2002).
25Given this model assumes that import demand is perfectly price-inelastic, for a depre-
ciation of the real exchange rate to improve the trade balance, the price elasticity of export
demand must be greater than one.
26Stagnationism is a term used in the structuralist literature that originated with Steindl
(1952), who argued that there is a tendency in capitalist economies for industries to con-
centrate, profit margins to rise, and overall aggregate demand to stagnate. Building on
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Steindl’s work, models by Dutt (1984 and 1990), Rowthorn (1982), and Taylor (1979 and
1983) have shown that a rise in the profit share depresses both capacity utilization and
growth in economies characterized by excess capacity under certain conditions.
27This terminology is borrowed from Marglin & Bhaduri (1990) to describe a positive
relationship between capacity utilization and the profit share. With a linearized form of the
investment demand function, the exhilarationist result is only possible due to the existence
of international trade. See Marglin & Bhaduri (1990), Mott & Slattery (1994), and Blecker
(2002) for a discussion.
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Table 1: Percent of Firms in Each Sector that Sell Output to Firms From Another Sector
(Johannesburg 1999)
Buyer Seller
Informal Firms Large Formal Firms
Large formal firms 4.8 88.6
Small formal firms 20.2 n/a*
Foreign firms 3.0 45.8
Government 2.0 34.6
Households 88.8 n/a
Number of respondents 499 328
Source: Adapted from Schaefer (2001) based on survey data for the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area.
* The abbreviation n/a means not available.
Table 2: Reasons Why Informal Sector Owners Started Their Business (Johannesburg
1999)
Reason for Starting Business Percent of Informal Sector Owners
Unemployed 51.6
Have job but income insufficient 27.9
Profit opportunity 9.1
Family business 6.6
To work from home 3.4
Disabled 0.4
Household reasons 1.1
Number of respondents 473
Source: Adapted from Schaefer (2001) based on survey data for the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area.
1
Table 3: Percent of Informal Sector Owners by Value of Capital Required to Start-Up
Business and Average Monthly Sales Range (1999)
Average Monthly Sales (Rands)
Start-Up Capital 1 to 1001 to 1501 to 3001 to Over
Requirement 1000 1500 3000 10,000 10,000
0-500 Rands 57.0 33.3 27.1 22.9 27.3
501-1000 Rands 18.3 16.7 16.8 10.0 7.3
1001-2000 Rands 8.6 20.8 16.8 8.6 14.6
2001-5000 Rands 9.7 16.7 14.0 15.7 10.9
Over 5000 Rands 6.5 12.5 25.2 42.9 40.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Number of respondents 96 97 108 142 56
Source: Adapted from Schaefer (2001) based on survey data for the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area.
Note: The average 1999 exchange rate was 6.10 Rands per US Dollar.
Table 4: Percent of Informal Sector Owners by Skill Level (1999)
Skill Level Labor Class Entrepreneurial Class
No vocational skills 75.5 59.0
Skilled/semi-skilled 18.5 29.0
Master craftsman 6.0 12.0
Total 100 100
Number of respondents 233 266
Source: Adapted from Schaefer (2001) based on survey data for the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area.
Table 5: Percent of Informal Sector Owners Reporting Access to Infrastructure (Johannes-
burg 1999)
Type of Infrastructure* Labor Class Entrepreneurial Class
Own transport 27.0 56.8
Post box 25.3 33.8
Telephone 36.9 48.1
Water 59.7 81.2
Electricity 61.4 85.0
Number of respondents 233 266
Source: Adapted from Schaefer (2001) based on survey data for the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area.
*Questionnaire asked owner to reply yes or no to whether they had access to each asset or service.
2
Table 6: Capacity Utilization Measures for Large Formal Firms (1997 and 1998)
1998 1997
Percent of firms producing at full capacity 7.0 8.8
Percent of firms running double or triple labor shift 37.2 37.5
For firms at less than full capacity:
Mean percentage more they could produce with existing capacity 46.0 43.7
Source: Adapted from Schaefer (2001) based on survey data for the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area.
3
Table 7: Equations of the Model
Equation Equations
Number
(1) Xn = Cfn + Cnn
or (2) Xf = Cff + Cnf + gfKf + gnKn + E
(1′) Xn = Xne +Xnw
(3) E = Aqψ
(4) xn = Xne/Kn
(5) L = bfwXf + bnwXnw
(6) Lfw = bfwXf
(7) Lnw = bnwXnw
(8) Pn = wnbnw
(8′) Pn = wnbne + rnePf/xne
(9) Pf = wfbfw + Pwmeaf + rfkPf/xf
(10) xf = Xf/Kf
(11) Pf = τ(wfbfw + Pwmeaf )
(12) pi = (τ − 1)/(τ)
(13) φ =
ePwmaf
wfbf+ePwmaf
(14′) τ = τ1/(1+θ)θ/(1+θ)
(15) q = ePwx/Pf
(16)  = qτ
(17) z = Pn/Pf
(18) D = wfLfw + γfkrfkPfKf + γnePnxnKn + wnLnw
(19) Y = D/N
(20) λ = Kn/Kf
(21) PfCff = (1− β)[wfLfw + γfkrfkPfKf ]
(22) PnCfn = β[wfLfw + γfkrfkPfKf ]
(23) PfCnf = (1− β)[γnePnxnKn + wnLnw]
(24) PnCnn = β[γnePnxnKn + wnLnw]
(25) β = β(Y, z)
(26′) M = qρmafXf + qρiµfgfKf
(27) gfmKf = µfgfKf
(28) ρi = Pwi/Pwx
(29) ρm = Pwm/Pwx
(30) gn = (1− γne)xnz
(31) gf (ePwiµf + 1) = gf + g1pi + g2xf
(32) F = E −M
(33) gfKf + F = (1− γfk)rfkKf
4
Table 8: Variables of the Model
Number of Endogenous Exogenous
Variables Variables Variables
1 Xf Kf
2 Xn Kn
3 Cff L
4 Cnf bfw
5 Cfn bne
6 Cnn bnw
7 Lfw wf
8 Lnw xn
9 Xne γfk
10 Xnw γne
11 D N
12 Y gf
13 Pf g1
14 Pn g2
15 rfk A
16 rne af
17 β τ
18 gn θ
19 gf ψ
20 pi Pwm
21 z Pwx
22 xf Pwi
23 wn µf
24 λ e
25 E
26 φ
27 q
28 τ
29 
30 M
31 gfm
32 ρi
33 ρm
34 F
5
Table 9: Solutions to Some Partial Derivatives
dq/dτ = −11+θ (τ
−2−θ
1+θ 
1
1+θ ) < 0
dqψ/dτ = −ψ1+θ (τ
−ψ−1−θ
1+θ 
ψ
1+θ ) < 0
dq/de = 11+θ (τ
−1
1+θwfbfw
−1
1+θPwx
1
1+θ e
−θ
1+θ ) > 0
dqψ/de = ψ1+θ (τ
−ψ
1+θwfbfw
−ψ
1+θPwx
ψ
1+θ e
−ψ−1−θ
1+θ ) > 0
dpi/dτ = 11+θ (τ
−2−θ
1+θ 
−θ
1+θ ) > 0
dpi/de = θ1+θ (τ
−1
1+θwfbfw
−θ
1+θPwx
−θ
1+θ e
−2θ−1
1+θ ) > 0
dRf/dq =
−2ρiµf
(qρiµf+1)2
< 0
dφ/de =
bfwPwmafwf
(wfbfw+ePwmaf )2
> 0
dz/dq = Pn/ePwx > 0
6
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Figure 1: IS and NN Curves: Inelastic Informal Sector Budget Share vs. Elastic Informal
Sector Budget Share
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Figure 2: Flow Chart of a Devaluation of the Nominal Exchange Rate
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Figure 3: Devaluation of the Nominal Exchange Rate in a Stagnationist Economy: Strong
RIE (left panel) vs. Weak RIE (right panel)
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Figure 4: A Devaluation of the Nominal Exchange Rate in an Exhilarationist Economy:
Strong RIE (left panel) vs. Weak RIE (right panel)
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Figure 5: A Fall in the Target Mark-Up Factor: Weak RIE (left panel) vs. Strong RIE
(right panel)
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